The Obama administration has now expressed its support for a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations, picking up where the Outer Space Treaty left off. The primary purposes of a Code of Conduct are to affirm norms to mitigate debris, help establish traffic-management procedures and increase safety for space operations. The European Union and the governments of Japan, Canada, and Australia have already expressed support for an initiative along these lines.

With the Obama administration’s declaration of intent, debate over a Code of Conduct has become sharper. It is hard to make the case against strengthening norms for responsible behavior in space, but the outlines of domestic and international criticism are now evident. One set of arguments finds the Code of Conduct lacking because it is insufficient. In this view, the Obama administration should focus on a treaty that bans weapons and warfare in space. This critique is voiced most strongly by Moscow, Beijing, and by some U.S. analysts who note that space-warfare capabilities are advancing, especially those inherent in U.S. theater missile defense systems.

These arguments are weak for several reasons. A treaty banning weapons that can be used in space is neither feasible nor verifiable, since many essential, multi-purpose military capabilities can be used to interfere with, disable, or destroy objects in space. Some of these capabilities, such as land- and sea-based ballistic missiles, have existed for over half a century. Their number has declined greatly, but they are not going to be eliminated any time in the foreseeable future.

Other capabilities that could be applied to space warfare, including theater missile defense interceptors, are growing in number. Concerns that hundreds of TMD interceptors could be used as KE-ASATs are over the top: the use of only a few of them would produce destructive pin-ball ASAT effects by means of debris fragments. China demonstrated this folly in 2007. Adherence to a space Code of Conduct would effectively end this particular practice. It would not, however, end BMD testing that avoids the creation of undesirable debris fields.

Banning all military capabilities that can be directed against satellites isn’t feasible. Banning weapon systems “dedicated” to the ASAT mission isn’t consequential, because so many technologies and weapon systems could be used as potential ASATs. Russia and China have proposed a treaty that adopts an Alice-in-Wonderland approach by banning “any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, specially produced or converted to eliminate, damage or disrupt normal function of objects.” This definition is both too narrow and broad at one at the same time – a rare feat. It does, however, have the virtue of clarifying how difficult it is to define and ban space weapons.

No agreement can foreclose wars of aggression or lesser forms of deliberate mischief making in space. But a Code of Conduct can clarify wrongdoing and facilitate corrective responses, while setting norms that reduce the likelihood of devastating accidents and grave miscalculations.

Beijing and Moscow are ramping up their space warfare capabilities as they call for a treaty that they know won’t be negotiated. The Pentagon is not sitting still, either. The relevant choice before us is whether to set norms for responsible behavior by major space-faring nations, or to maximize flexibility to engage in space warfare.

Some critics in the United States oppose a Code of Conduct because it seems too much like a treaty that could impede U.S. war fighting in space. For example, Dean Cheng and Baker Spring at the Heritage Foundation argue that a Code of Conduct would jeopardize the U.S. ability to engage in testing of both space weapons and space combat doctrines. In their view, a Code of Conduct would diminish American security without creating widely accepted norms. John Bolton has echoed this line, calling the pursuit of a Code of Conduct “mindless.”

These critiques dwell on potential rule breakers, especially China. If, as critics assert, a Code of Conduct would not be helpful for norm setting, how would its rejection improve the conduct that they find most objectionable in others? An analogous argument could be made against highway traffic regulations. There are speeding limits and other rules to promote highway safety, but not everyone abides by them. Would we be safer by dispensing with traffic regulations?

To be sure, rule breaking in space can be far more consequential than anarchy on the highways. As a practical matter, if China and Russia play by their own rules, the United States will, as well. A Code of Conduct will fall short unless it includes the three most important space-faring nations. India, a rising space power, also has a rare opportunity to get off the sidelines and to help shape and join this compact.

Another argument used against the Code is that it is unnecessary because it is superfluous. If, indeed, a Code of Conduct would merely reaffirm what is widely acknowledged as responsible behavior, why oppose it? In actuality, an effective Code of Conduct would both reaffirm some existing norms, such as debris mitigation, while extending them to the realm of space traffic management.

Yet another argument against the Code is that it does not impose severe penalties or sanctions for misbehavior. Critics fail to clarify how their desire to impose penalties or sanctions can be advanced by opposing a Code of Conduct. Without rules, there are no rule breakers.

Some critics worry that a Code could lull the United States into a false sense of security when China is increasing its military capabilities in space, on land and at sea – especially China’s growing sea-denial capabilities against the U.S. Pacific Fleet. These concerns were also expressed in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union placed satellites in orbit that could sometimes track U.S. surface combatants.

Back then, Washington and Moscow tested anti-satellite weapons infrequently before shelving them. During the Cold War, the notion of protecting surface navies by preemptively attacking satellites was widely dismissed as being extremely dangerous, especially because satellites were intertwined with the nuclear deterrents of both superpowers.

Yet another argument against the Code is that it should not take the form of an executive agreement, thereby avoiding the Senate’s powers of advice and consent. This ignores considerable precedent, including the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the 1989 Dangerous Military Practices Agreement and the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct, which established comparable practices for operations at sea, on the ground, in the air, and related to ballistic missiles. These executive agreements were negotiated during the presidencies of Richard Nixon, George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush.

With one Cold War receding in the rear-view mirror, it makes little sense to invite a new one, if it can be avoided. The United States and China have the ability to interfere with or destroy satellites. As was the case with the Soviet Union, mutual capabilities to engage in space warfare constitute a basis for restraint and deterrence. This reality will exist with or without a Code of Conduct. This reality also makes a Code of Conduct all the more essential to affirm responsible behavior and to facilitate appropriate responses if others act irresponsibly.

Domestic critics of a space Code of Conduct from the Left want an ambitious new treaty that cannot be scoped properly, is not verifiable, and is unacceptable to the US Senate. Critics from the Right want maximum flexibility to develop and use space warfare capabilities. Their approach was tried during the Bush administration during which there was ASAT testing, a satellite collision, and a huge increase in the space debris population. Critics from the Left and the Right have not made a persuasive case against the Code of Conduct. Nor have they offered a better alternative.

An example of Nixon’s insularity and Kissinger’s stroking methods occurred on April 23, 1971, when Nixon met with Kissinger and Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman to get up to speed on the SALT negotiations. Kissinger buoyed Nixon with his assessment that the Soviets, “to all practical purposes, [have] given in on this SALT thing… they have yielded 98 percent. They’ve practically accepted our position on the SALT.” Over the next thirteen months, with the Pentagon and Hawks on Capitol Hill like Senator Scoop Jackson raising alarms against the impending deals, Kissinger shifted his argument, railing against weaklings in the executive branch and Doves on Capitol Hill for undermining US leverage in the negotiations.

Both Machiavellis wound up outfoxing themselves more than the Kremlin in these negotiations. Kissinger’s use of a back-channel to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to circumvent the interagency team led by Ambassador Gerard Smith caused repeated perturbations. Soviet negotiators, who were clued into the back-channel, periodically attempted to use this inside information for advantage. Kissinger and Nixon often fulminated about the consequences of their own tactics. Take, for example, their conversation on March 11, 1971:

That son-of-bitch [Dobrynin] is just taking your letter [Nixon to Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin dated February 17, 1971] without telling Smith he’s got it, and feeling out whether Smith is willing to give more.

Domestic subterfuge can be forgiven if absolutely necessary in the pursuit of clearly advantageous outcomes. In this case, subterfuge and duplicity did not produce better outcomes and contributed to a significant domestic backlash against SALT just two years after the Congress voted near-unanimously to support these accords.

Nixon is in charge at high-level interagency meetings in which he adheres to his talking points, follows a set agenda, and is in a listening mode. He also demonstrates a sure grasp of the politics of SALT. But on matters of substance, Nixon occasionally appears tentative and sometimes befuddled in private meetings with Kissinger.

For example, the last big unresolved issue in the Interim Agreement was whether to include SLBMs and how to deal with older Soviet subs. Here’s a conversation between Nixon and Kissinger on March 31, 1972, less than two months before the Moscow summit:

Kissinger: You know, with [Secretary of State William] Rogers – Rogers said to him [Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin], ‘We want SLBMs in SALT, one way or the other.’ So, Dobrynin asked him, ‘Well, what do you mean?’ Rogers said, ‘Well, I don’t know any details. ‘I’m just telling you.’ And—

Nixon: That’s the trouble—

Kissinger: That—

Nixon: Dobrynin does know the details.

Kissinger: And Dobrynin does know the details, because I had told him our position [short break]

Nixon: I am inclined to think that the SLBMs shouldn’t be included…

Kissinger: Well, no, we’ll get them – no, we’ll get them included now.

Nixon: Do we want them included?

Kissinger: Frankly, I don’t think we do, but I – but we – I don’t see how we can go against the [Joint] Chiefs of Staff.

Between them, Nixon and Kissinger owned the franchise of books offering sage advice about international relations, but they made many questionable calls in these negotiations. Take, for example, a memo on July 13, 1970, sent by Kissinger to Nixon titled, “Implications of a Limited SALT Agreement,” in which he discussed how an interim agreement and an ABM deal might play out:

With the Soviet ABM limited, we would run into increasing pressure to curtail or terminate our MIRV programs. On the other hand, we would be largely relieved of the most immediate concerns of the most immediate concerns over Soviet capabilities for a neutralizing strike against Minuteman silos, and gain some time to adjust our posture…

Unlike the [1963] test ban treaty which served as a trigger for substantial increases in certain military programs, a SALT agreement is likely to add momentum to the general shift in priorities from military to civilian programs

These projections proved to be entirely wrong.

In their defense, Nixon and Kissinger were caught in a bind. Soviet strategic modernization programs were ongoing during these negotiations; US counters were in the offing. The Nixon administration did not entertain the option of deep cuts as a counter to the Soviet missile build up. It did consider ACDA’s “Stop Where We Are” proposals, but these were opposed by the Pentagon and deemed strategically unwise and politically unacceptable by the White House. US negotiating options were crafted before the Intelligence Community began to fully appreciate the extent of the Soviet missile buildup.

Nixon and Kissinger were not clear at the outset of SALT what outcomes they were angling for. Nor were they able to align negotiating ends and diplomatic means when, beginning in 1971, the Pentagon began to raise increasingly trenchant warnings about this mismatch. Nixon and Kissinger weren’t about to consider major changes in US proposals at this point, which would have meant sacrificing SALT before the elections. Instead, they kept existing options in play until the prospect of the Moscow summit loomed.

One cardinal rule of diplomacy is not to negotiate against a deadline, especially without your negotiating team and your own translators. But Nixon and Kissinger could not resist closing historic deals in Moscow while members of the US SALT delegation were cooling their heels in Helsinki. The outlines of this story have been well told, but the devil, as Paul Nitze liked to say, is in the details. There are many damning details in this volume.

The SALT I negotiations were a train wreck of confusion, duplicity, mismanagement and mis-steps that nonetheless resulted in historic accomplishments – the first compacts between two ideological foes to impose guidelines on their strategic arms competition. The ABM Treaty, now widely reviled in Republican circles, was a significant achievement. The Congress and American taxpayers would not support efforts to erect a nation-wide defense against Soviet missiles, and industry was incapable of delivering an effective product, regardless of cost. After wandering all over the map on missile defenses during the negotiations, Nixon reluctantly accepted these facts and removed one driver for the arms race.

Other drivers remained, and were unimpeded by the SALT I Interim Agreement. The nuclear arms race was extraordinarily hard to tame in the early ‘70s. The Nixon administration couldn’t do without MIRVs, and Moscow couldn’t do without its strategic modernization programs. The issues under negotiation were too complex, the negotiators were starting from scratch, and very powerful constituencies were distrustful of any result and well positioned to limit the limits. The Interim Agreement was deeply imperfect, but it laid the groundwork for better results over time.

How, then, you might well ask, could such a defective US negotiating process still result in historic agreements? To paraphrase the Jack Nicholson character in “A Few Good Men,” if you can’t handle irony and paradox when it comes to the Bomb, you can’t handle the truth.

Personality matters in the politics of the subcontinent, as personality shapes ambition and policy preference. The personalities that matter most are India’s Prime Minister and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff.

Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Morarji Desai were disinclined to advance India’s nuclear weapon programs, as was Vikram Sarabhai, the head of India’s Atomic Energy Commission. Their successors thought differently about the Bomb, and India now has a nuclear deterrent. A civilian, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, jump-started Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programs after Pakistan’s disastrous 1971 war with India. After his demise, Pakistani decision-making relating to the bomb has been the province of the Army Chief and a few, trusted advisors.

In the world’s largest democracy, decisions on national security also rest on very few shoulders. As V.R. Raghavan has written in the Nonproliferation Review, there has been a shift in Indian decision making “from a collegial and consensus-based process to decisions arrived at by a small group of individuals based in the prime minister’s office.” Partly for this reason, Kanti Bajpai has worried in Inside Nuclear South Asia that a future Indian government led by a more assertive leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party might be more inclined to resume nuclear testing or to pursue a more bellicose approach to Pakistan. A novice Congress Party leader might also seek to prove his or her mettle by being more hawkish toward Pakistan.

A surprisingly diverse group of military officers have risen to become Chiefs of Army Staff in India and Pakistan, in part because promotion to the top job is usually, but not always, based on time in service. Otherwise, it is hard to explain the elevation of the current Indian Chief of Army Staff, who has filed suit to extend his tenure. When longevity dictates promotion, personalities will vary and surprises can result. Pakistani political leaders have also been surprised when they skipped down the seniority ladder to pick Army Chiefs, as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Zia ul-Haq) and Nawaz Sharif (Pervez Musharraf) learned to their subsequent regret. Likewise, in a country where civil-military relations are badly skewed, it is usually unwise for Pakistani political leaders to extend active duty service for their Army Chiefs. The book of political expediency in Pakistan typically does not have happy endings.

Crises become more likely when risk-taking personalities become Army Chiefs during the tenure of weak, uncertain, or unseasoned Prime Ministers. An inexperienced Rajiv Gandhi was not paying close attention when K. Sundarji planned to carry out very large-scale, multi-staged exercises in 1986-7. Some believe that Operation Brasstacks was designed to prompt a war with Pakistan before it acquired nuclear weapons. A crisis in 1990 was also sparked in part by large-scale military exercises, this time designed by Mirza Aslam Beg at a time when two weak Prime Ministers, Benazir Bhutto and V.P. Singh, held office. The Kargil crisis was abetted by Nawaz Sharif’s disinclination to ask very hard questions of his military briefers and his inability to put the brakes on Musharraf’s plan for an audacious land grab across the Line of Control in 1999.

The late, great Indian strategic analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, wrote that “changes in Army Chiefs of Staff in Pakistan are as important as changes in heads of government.” Subrahmanyam’s reasoning remains unassailable, since effective command of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal rests in the hands of Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff.

The next combination of a weak Prime Minister and a bold Army Chief is more likely to occur in Pakistan than in India. The last Indian Army Chief slightly reminiscent of Sundarji was General S. Padmanabhan who, like Sundarji, hailed from the south, wrote fiction based on military plans, and chafed at the bit to “sort out” Pakistan. After an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 carried out by extremists based and trained in Pakistan, Padmanabhan was kept firmly in check by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appears to have been much less inclined to consider a military response after the 2008 attacks on iconic targets in Mumbai, again carried out by Pakistani extremists.

This track record does not tie the hands of a future Indian Prime Minister. But it is notable that two veteran politicians representing coalition governments across much of the Indian political spectrum have held tight reins on the Indian military despite severe provocations. These mass-casualty assaults were directed against targets that extremists within Pakistan find most objectionable — India’s secular democracy, economic growth and cosmopolitanism. The attacks backfired, steepening Pakistan’s decline while advancing India’s standing, partly because Indian Prime Ministers placed a higher priority on maintaining economic growth than on waging war with Pakistan.

As noted, New Delhi’s future restraint after severe provocations is not foreordained. If New Delhi decides to strikes back, the Indian Army Chief is unlikely to be in the driver’s seat; he will be following orders. In contrast, Pakistani Army Chiefs are disinclined to take orders from civilians, except ones they agree with.

The timing isn’t bad, despite this being an election year. This summer, a group of governmental experts dealing with space issues will convene in New York. This forum, consisting of representatives from fifteen nations, has a workable mandate, unlike the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. One topic of conversation will no doubt be an ambitious and unverifiable treaty to ban weapons and threats from space championed by Russia and China. Another will be transparency and confidence-building measures in space, a subject that both Moscow and Washington can agree on, but probably not in every particular. A third topic of discussion will be the European Union’s draft Code of Conduct, which has been endorsed by Japan and Canada. The GGE could become another forum for wrangling and a wasted opportunity. It could also become the springboard to engage countries not involved in the EU’s effort to help shape a consensus diplomatic initiative on space.

International endorsement of a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations is not small change. There is a clear need to strengthen norms for space debris mitigation, traffic management and responsible stewardship of this endangered global commons. The Code of Conduct initiative could also help ameliorate US-Russian relations and provide China a way to step up to its responsibilities in space. To become a stakeholder, Beijing will have to drop its aversion to engage on realistic proposals. Like Moscow at the beginning of the SALT negotiations, Beijing will find deliberations over a Code of Conduct to be a challenge with respect to civil-military coordination and the acceptance of greater transparency.

After the US presidential elections, we will have a better sense of whether Washington will continue to champion the Code of Conduct and whether Moscow and Beijing will come on board. The pendulum swings of American electoral politics could foreclose the former and make a powerful case for the latter.

There have been five particularly horrific years of living dangerously in the nuclear age. The first was, most jarringly, 1945, when the Bomb made its spectacular appearance. No advance in the history of warfare was more jarring than a city-killing weapon that could be delivered by surprise for which there was no defense.

The second period of maximum danger was 1949-1950, when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb, President Truman endorsed a crash program to proceed with far more powerful thermonuclear weapons, the People’s Republic of China was born, and the Korean War began. It was an open question whether or not atomic bombs would again be used to end a prolonged land war in Asia that was at times going very badly for the United States before it ground to a bitter stalemate.

The third year of living dangerously was 1962, when the Cuban missile crises played out over thirteen days. This crisis occurred at a time when there were no tacit rules of engagement between the Superpowers and before the era of communication satellites or “hotlines.” (It took half a day to code, transmit, via Western Union, and translate Nikita Khrushchev’s first letter to President John F. Kennedy.) In the meantime, dramas unfolded in a matter of minutes that could have changed the course of planetary history.

The fourth year of living dangerously was 1983, the year that President Ronald Reagan declared the Soviet Union to be the focus of evil in the world, when he surprised nearly everyone by announcing the Strategic Defense Initiative aimed at providing an astrodome-like protection against missile attack, Soviet air defense forces shot down a Korean Airlines plane with a Congressman on board that had strayed hopelessly off course, the United States began to deploy new missiles based in Western Europe, and the Kremlin walked out of nuclear negotiations.

The fifth year of living dangerously was 2001, when Americans became acutely conscious of their vulnerability due to the seething rage of nineteen young men, mostly Saudi, who used jet fuel as bombs against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. These attacks unhinged the U.S. electorate sufficiently to endorse the prosecution of two prolonged wars that are unlikely to be worth the great sacrifices of their prosecution.

Anxiety produced by years of living dangerously remains in the bloodstream of the body politic for many years afterward. Political debate and poor decisions thrive on anxious metaphors – Munich is still a hardy perennial – even when the passage of time dulls their import and relevance. Because anxiety takes refuge at the cellular level, threat inflation never grows old: we always overreact to jarring events.

The Bomb and insecurity are inseparable. Nuclear weapon requirements advance during years of living dangerously and then recede over time, leaving remnants of force structure behind. The Bomb doesn’t help major powers get what they want in this world. Still, attachment to the Bomb, like anxiety, is a hard habit to break. Nuclear weapons continue to be especially useful for states that are not good company, but do not wish to be ignored or leveraged by stronger powers.

US presidents of quite different persuasions have managed to implement cooperative arrangements for threat reduction to help prevent new nightmares related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the advent of messianic terrorism. Republican and Democratic presidents have also maintained and updated frameworks to reduce old-fashioned nuclear threats, largely by means of treaties, reducing global stockpiles by 70 percent.

This track record of reducing nuclear dangers and avoiding nuclear nightmares rivals all other diplomatic accomplishments since the end of World War II. Treaty critics credit this extraordinary result to peace through strength, including the prospect of devastating, potentially genocidal threats, more politely known as nuclear deterrence. They are only half right. Nuclear arms racing without diplomacy increases insecurity. Arms build-ups and deterrence require reassurance to maintain the nuclear peace. Nuclear deterrence without arms control is like trying to construct a lasting, protective edifice with bricks but no mortar.

In the best lyric category, Josh Pollack’s strong preference was “Crawl Out Through The Fallout” by Sheldon Allman (1960), but nobody submitted this entry. The opening stanza:

Crawl out through the fallout, baby
When they drop that bomb
Crawl out through the fallout
With the greatest of aplomb
When your white count’s getting higher
Hurry, don’t delay
I’ll hold you close and kiss those
Radiation burns away

I am extremely partial to “Harvest for the World” by the Isley Brothers (1976). Granted, a bit on the generic side, but I’m a sucker for the lyrics, the spangled bell bottoms, and the guitar riffs. Here’s a sample lyric:

Dress me up for battle, when all I want is peace
Those of us who pay the price, come home with the least
Nation after nation, turning into beast
When will there be a harvest for the world

Again, no takers. As for the actual submissions, our panel of judges was particularly impressed by the following entries:

Anon’s choice of “The Russians,” by Sting:

How can I save my little boy
From Oppenheimer’s deadly toy?
There is no monopoly on common sense
On either side of the political fence
We share the same biology
Regardless of ideology
Believe me when I say to you
I hope the Russians love their children too

Alex W. scored highly with Weird Al’s “Christmas at Ground Zero,” perhaps in honor of the season.

Francois Heisbourg also received kudos for nominating Guy Beart’s “Le Grand Chambardement.” Josh Pollack advises readers to watch this video: “Although the audio track is a bit on the quiet side, you’ll get a sense of the almost [Tom] Lehrer-like spirit that animates the song. Jaunty rhymes juxtaposed with ghastly lyrical images. Beart’s affect is much closer to deadpan than Lehrer’s mischievous eye-gleams, though.”

The judges were partial to lyrics involving imagery of the Bomb as a burning sun. Kevin scored with the Dubliners’ “Sun is Burning.” Ditto for Diamond Dave, with Pink Floyd’s “Two Suns in the Sunset”:

The rusty wire that holds the cork
that keeps the anger in gives way
And suddenly it’s day again
The sun is in the east even though the day is done
Two suns in the sunset
Could be the human race is run

Re made the top tier with Iron Maiden’s “Brighter Than a Thousand Suns”:

Out of the universe, a strange light is born
Unholy union, trinity reformed
Yellow sun its evil twin
in the black the winds deliver him
We will sleep to souls within
At a siege a nuclear gust is riven

Amazing lyrics. Who knew that heavy metal could be so heavy? Turning to the best adapted lyric category, our panel of judges was extremely impressed by Andy’s take on Cake’s “The Distance.” Original lyrics:

Reluctantly crouched at the starting line,
engines pumping and thumping in time.
the green light flashes, the flags go up.
churning and burning, they yearn for the cup.
they deftly maneuver and muscle for rank,
fuel burning fast on an empty tank.
reckless and wild, they pour through the turns.
their prowess is potent and secretly stern.
as they speed through the finish, the flags go down.
the fans get up and they get out of town.
the arena is empty except for one man,
still driving and striving as fast as he can.
the sun has gone down and the moon has come up,
and long ago somebody left with the cup.
but he’s driving and striving and hugging the turns.
and thinking of someone for whom he still burns.
he’s going the distance.
he’s going for speed.
she’s all alone
all alone in her time of need.
because he’s racing and pacing and plotting the course,
he’s fighting and biting and riding on his horse,
he’s going the distance.

Andy’s adaptation:

The missile is crouched, the launch is on line,
the fuel is pumping and thumping in time.
the green light flashes, the rocket goes high
churning and burning, it tears through the sky.
it deftly maneuvers and muscles for rank,
Mox burning fast on an empty tank.
reckless and wild, it hits the apogee
its package is ready to spread mass agony.
as its speeds to the finish, the package heads down.
the people have no time, they can’t get out of town.
the bunker is empty except for one man,
still sitting, and thinking, his face in his hands.
the sun has gone down and the moon has come up,
humanity now just a drop in a cup.
in the bunker he watches the clock as it turns,
while thinking of someone as the city burns.
it’s going the distance.
it’s going for speed.
it’s all alone
all alone for the final deed.
because it’s racing and pacing and plotting the course,
on its way to deliver the ultimate force,
it’s going the distance.

Theo Kalionzes received very high marks for his adaptation of Bob Dylan’s “Subterranean Homesick Blues.” The original lyric:

Johnny’s in the basement
Mixing up the medicine
I’m on the pavement
Thinking about the government
The man in the trench coat
Badge out, laid off
Says he’s got a bad cough
Wants to get it paid off
Look out kid
It’s somethin’ you did
God knows when
But you’re doin’ it again
You better duck down the alley way
Lookin’ for a new friend
The man in the coon-skip cap
In the big pen
Wants eleven dollar bills
You only got ten.

Now here’s Theo’s “Subterranean Nukesick Blues”:

Yukiya’s in VIC
Mixing up the deluge
I’m on the pavement
Thinking about the centrifuge
The man in the dulband
Hands up, who me?
Ahmadinejad says its for peaceful energy
Look out kid
Its somethin’ they did
They ain’t gonna duck down the alley way
Lookin’ for a new way
Everyone knows the NAMs still an ally
The man in the White House
With the big pen
Wants eleven dollar bills
They’ve got twelve man.

Kapowski scored heavily with his adaptation of Def Leopard’s “Pour Some Sugar on Me.” The original lyric:

Love is like a bomb, baby, c’mon get it on
Livin’ like a lover with a radar phone
Lookin’ like a tramp, like a video vamp
Demolition woman, can I be your man?
Razzle ‘n’ a dazzle ‘n’ a flash a little light
Television lover, baby, go all night
Sometime, anytime, sugar me sweet
Little miss ah innocent sugar me, yeah

Kapowski’s revision:

Tryin’ to move a bomb, baby, like Abdul Q. Khan
Livin’ like a baller ’til my cover’s blown
Lookin’ like a scam, but I don’t give a damn
Sell a turnkey program to someone in Iran?
Razzle ‘n’ a dazzle in Uranium’s aglow
Better take cover, baby, it’s about to blow
Sometime, anytime, for a small fee
For all your ‘tomic needs, baby, just call me, yeah

Melissa deserves props for her adaptation of “Whatever Lola Wants”:

Whatever Jong-il wants
Jong-il gets
And little bomb, little Jong-il wants you
Make up your mind to have no regrets
Design yourself, enshrine yourself, go BOOM!
He always gets what he “aims” for
And your heart’n soul is what he came for

Lastly, Nick Ritchie’s nomination of Senator John McCain for his riff on the Beach Boys classic, “Barbara Ann” (“Bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb Iran…”) was very tough to ignore.

It’s a damn near-impossible task to pick winners, but that’s why they pay our panel of judges the big bucks. The winners are Anon with Sting and Andy with his adaptation of “The Distance.” To receive your prizes, contact me (krepon@stimson.org) with your mailing addresses and the inscriptions you would like in your books.

These lists may not be exhaustive. For example, Sam Black, who updated these tables for me when he was working at the Stimson Center, found a reference to an accident on January 9, 1956 involving a B-36 bomber in a February 1991 report by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. If readers can confirm or know more about this event, please send word. Here are Sam’s other additions:

January 18, 1959, Unspecified Pacific Base. A grounded F-100 interceptor carrying a nuclear weapon without its fissile core burst into flames when its external fuel tanks were inadvertently jettisoned during a practice alert. The fire was doused in less than ten minutes and there were no reported contamination or cleanup problems.

July 6, 1959, Barksdale Air Force Base, Bossier City, Louisiana. A C-124 aircraft transporting a nuclear weapon without its fissile core crashed during takeoff, completely destroying the aircraft and nuclear weapon.

September 25, 1959, Off Whidbey Island, Washington. A U.S. Navy P-5M aircraft carrying a nuclear depth charge without its fissile core crashed into Puget Sound near Whidbey Island, Washington. The weapon was never recovered.

October 15, 1959, Hardinsberg, Kentucky. A B-52 bomber carrying two atomic bombs collided at 32,000 feet with a KC-135 refueling aircraft shortly after initiating refueling procedures near Hardinsberg, Kentucky. The ensuing crash killed eight crew members and partially burned one of the weapons. No nuclear material was reportedly released, and the unarmed weapons were recovered intact. Both planes had departed from Columbus Air Force Base in Mississippi.

January 24, 1961, Goldsboro, North Carolina. A B-52 bomber on airborne alert carrying two nuclear weapons with their fissile cores broke apart in midair. The B-52 experienced structural failure in its right wing. The aircraft’s breakup released the two weapons from a height of 2,000-10,000 feet. One of the bomb’s parachutes deployed properly and that weapon’s damage was minimal. However, the second bomb’s parachute malfunctioned and the weapon broke apart upon impact, scattering its components over a wide area. Published reports indicated that five of the six safety devices on this weapon failed.
January 16, 1961, Undisclosed U.S. Air Force Base, Great Britain. A nuclear bomber on airborne alert crashed on takeoff causing spilled fuel to erupt into flames which engulfed the aircraft at an undisclosed USAF base in Great Britain. A nuclear weapon mounted on the aircraft’s centerline pylon was badly damaged before the fire could be extinguished. The U.S. Government has not acknowledged the accident and it is not included on the Pentagon’s list of broken arrows.

January 19, 1961, Monticello, Utah. A B-52 bomber carrying one or more nuclear weapons was reported to have exploded in midair north of Monticello, Utah. The bomber had left Biggs AFB near El Paso, Texas, bound for Bismarck, North Dakota, on a routine training mission. Near Monticello the aircraft began climbing from 36,000 to 40,000 feet and soon experienced severe difficulties. The aircraft descended rapidly and at an elevation of 7,000 feet broke into several pieces that landed within an area two miles wide by 11 miles long. Observers on the ground said the plane’s left-wing engine caught fire, after which there was a midair explosion. Five crewmen were killed in the accident.

March 14, 1961, Yuba City, California. A B-52 bomber carrying two nuclear weapons crashed. The weapons’ high explosive did not detonate and their safety devices worked properly. The aircraft had departed from Mather Air Force Base near Sacramento and was forced to descend to 10,000 feet after the crew compartment pressurization system failed.

January 13, 1964, Cumberland, Maryland. A B-52D bomber carrying two nuclear weapons crashed approximately 17 miles southwest of Cumberland, Maryland. The nuclear weapons were being ferried from Westover Air Force Base in Chicopee Falls, Massachusetts, to its home base at Turner Air Force Base in Albany, Georgia, when it encountered violent turbulence and suffered structural failure. Both weapons were recovered.

December 8, 1964, Bunker Hill (now Grissom) Air Force Base, Peru, Indiana. A B-58 bomber lost control and slid off a runway during taxi, causing portions of the five nuclear weapons onboard to burn in an ensuing fire. There were reportedly no detonations and contamination was limited to the immediate area of the crash.

October 11, 1965, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio. A C-124 transport aircraft containing nuclear weapon components and a dummy training device caught fire while being refueled. The fire started at the aft end of the refueling trailer and destroyed the aircraft’s fuselage. There were no casualties and the resultant radiation hazard was reported to be minimal.

December 5, 1965, Aboard the USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) in the Pacific Ocean. An A-4E Skyhawk aircraft carrying a B-43 H-bomb rolled off an elevator on the U.S. aircraft carrier Ticonderoga and fell into the sea. Officials feared that intense water pressure could have caused the B-43 hydrogen bomb to explode.

January 17, 1966, Palomares, Spain. A B-52 bomber carrying four hydrogen bombs collided in midair with a KC-135 tanker near Palomares, Spain. Of the four H-bombs aboard, two weapons’ high explosive material exploded on ground impact, releasing radioactive materials, including plutonium, around Palomares. Approximately 1,400 tons of slightly contaminated soil and vegetation were later taken to the United States for storage at an approved site. A third nuclear weapon fell to earth but remained relatively intact; the last one fell into the ocean.

January 21, 1968, Thule, Greenland. Four nuclear bombs were destroyed in a fire after the B-52 bomber carrying them crashed approximately seven miles southwest of the runway at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland. The B-52, from Plattsburgh Air Force Base in New York, crashed after a fire broke out in the navigator’s compartment. The pilot attempted an emergency landing. Upon impact with the ground, the plane burst into flames, igniting the high explosive outer coverings of at least one of the bombs. The explosive then detonated, scattering plutonium and other radioactive materials over an area about 300 yards on either side of the plane’s path.

February 14, 1974, Plattsburgh AFB, New York. The nose landing gear of a USAF FB-111 carrying two short range attack air-to-surface missiles and two nuclear bombs collapsed as the aircraft was commencing an engine run-up during an alert exercise. There was no damage to the weapons and they were unloaded without incident.

September 15, 1980, Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota. A B-52H bomber carrying nuclear-armed AGM-69 short range attack missiles caught fire while on the ground during an alert exercise. Wind conditions and the efforts of firefighters permitted the recovery of the missiles.

In geopolitical terms, Afghanistan matters most as a place where outsiders have pursued follies and expended fortunes. History loves to repeat itself in Afghanistan, where the silk route turns to quicksand for major powers. Since the Soviet Union’s departure, the two countries that have erred most grievously in Afghanistan are the United States and Pakistan. Both are now at loggerheads over a political settlement there that neither can control. This is more than mildly ironic, since Afghanistan matters far less geopolitically than the demise of the US-Pakistan partnership. A complete split in US-Pakistan ties would constitute a loss for both parties, but Pakistan will suffer far more from having lost a patron.

The United States and Pakistan have been partners since the 1950s. Pakistan’s perceived utility to the United States extended long after John Foster Dulles’ regional alliances to contain the Soviet Union — CENTO and SEATO — dissolved. Paradoxically, the rise and revitalization of the Taliban, with Rawalpindi’s support, created conditions whereby Pakistan could initially renew and then jeopardize its partnership with the United States.

In June 2004, Washington declared Pakistan to be a major non-NATO ally. It’s been a downhill ride ever since. Reversing this slide will take a good long while, especially if the Taliban re-take Kabul with Rawalpindi’s help. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s national security establishment is backing the Taliban as if the country’s future depended on it. Over time, Washington will likely prioritize its Afghan concerns and outlays to disrupting those who seek to engage in long-distance, mass casualty terrorism. By which time Pakistanis will recall how unreliable a partner the Taliban are.

China, Pakistan’s other powerful patron, is an “all weather” friend, providing significant support for Pakistan’s ballistic missile and nuclear weapon programs in the past. After the Bush administration gifted New Delhi with a qualified exemption to the rules of nuclear commerce, Beijing consented to repeated Pakistani requests for nuclear power plants at concessionary rates – reactors that may no longer be built on Chinese soil.

Islamabad is increasingly looking to Beijing for investment and infrastructure development, but big steps forward are hindered by Pakistan’s internal security problems. In a stunning blow to Pakistani economic development plans, the China Kingho Group pulled out of a $19 billion deal to build coal mines, power and chemical plants in Sindh because Beijing feels that Karachi is not safe to invest or reside in. Beijing has also called out Pakistan — a very unusual move — because of unrest in China’s western border areas stoked by militants trained in Pakistan. Islamabad has pledged to deal with the issues causing Chinese discontent, and seeks to get investment back on track.

During crises with India in 1990, 1999 and 2001-2, Pakistani civilian and military leaders made beelines to Beijing seeking backup. They received polite but unmistakable advice to resolve their difficulties with New Delhi without major new weapon shipments or shrill public warnings against Indian military adventurism. Beijing helped the United States, South Asia’s essential crisis manager, more than it helped Pakistan during these three crises.

During the millennial flood of 2010, the United States provided $550 million to help Pakistanis in great distress, including $62 million is seeds and agricultural implements so that farmers could produce a bumper wheat crop after the waters receded. After prodding by U.S. officials, China reportedly added $200 million in flood-related assistance to its initial offering of $47 million.

Pakistani government leaders have tried to strengthen their partnership with China in tangible ways as ties with the United States fray. One method of dealing with Washington’s growing disaffection is by characterizing security assurances purportedly made in private by Chinese officials in ways that Beijing has notably refrained from reaffirming.

For example, during Defense Minister Ahmed Mukhtar’s May 2011 trip to China, he spoke appreciatively of Chinese construction of the Gwadar port, while expressing an interest in Chinese construction of “a naval base” there. When asked about this request, a senior Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson replied, “I have not heard about it.”

This odd exchange was preceded by a meeting in Beijing between Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in May, 2011. Pakistani media outlets dutifully reported a Pakistani Foreign Ministry press release that, “China has warned in unequivocal terms that any attack on Pakistan would be construed as an attack on China. Beijing has advised Washington to respect Pakistan’s sovereignty and solidarity… The Chinese leadership was extremely forthcoming in assuring unprecedented support to Pakistan for its national cause and security.” Chinese media outlets did not report this assurance.

Similarly, after Admiral Mike Mullen vocalized his assessment about Rawalpindi’s ties with the Haqqani network before leaving his post as Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Prime Minister Gilani asserted the following week, during a visit by Vice Premier Meng Jianzhu, China’s minister of public safety,that China “categorically supports Pakistan’s efforts to uphold its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.” Again, Chinese media reports did not use this formulation.

Pakistan’s military will increasingly rely on Chinese equipment. But the track record of China-Pakistan relations — especially during natural disasters and crises with India — suggests a relationship in which Pakistan asks for much and Beijing is circumspect about giving.

As good as the entries are so far, I happen to know – and please do not consider this jury tampering – that none of you have yet to offer the lyric that will deliver Josh Pollack’s vote. There’s still one week to go, so keep these entries coming. We’ll close the contest on Thursday, December 22nd, and announce the winners after Christmas – assuming there are no Big Surprises in the meantime that divert us to more serious matters.

As before, the grand prize in each category will be an autographed copy with an inscription of your choice of a soon-to-be-remaindered book by yours truly. I have recruited my ACW co-conspirators, Jeffrey Lewis and Josh Pollack to help me with the judging. So as not to get too wonkbound on our panel of judges, I’ve wrangled the services of an external reviewer who has graciously waived his usual consulting fee. He is an avid concert-goer who knows his way around the dance floor, who introduced me to the Drive-By Truckers, My Morning Jacket, and the Black Keys, and who is helping our 15 month-old grand-daughter to polish her first dance moves. I speak of none other than The Total Package, Josh Krepon.

Oh, yes, the contest. Here’s how to play. First category: nuke-related lyric. Pick your favorite stanza from a song about the Bomb. For example, “Ape Man,” by the Kinks, a great band:

I’m a King Kong man, I’m a voo-doo man, I’m an ape man
I don’t feel safe in this world no more
I don’t want to die in a nuclear war
I want to sail away to a distant shore
And make like an ape man

ACW readers: I know you can top this. But not with “This Ain’t A Scene, It’s An Arms Race” by Fall Out Boy which, it so happens, ain’t about the Bomb. A pity. The best stanza chosen by our panel of judges wins.

Second category: best altered lyric. Take the Kinks again. Celluloid Heroes is one of my all-time favorites. How might it be altered to become about the Bomb? Here’s the original lyric:

Everybody’s a dreamer and everybody’s a star,
And everybody’s in movies, it doesn’t matter who you are.
There are stars in every city,
In every house and on every street,
And if you walk down Hollywood Boulevard,
Their names are written in concrete.

Here’s my alteration:

Everybody’s a pundit, and everybody’s a star,
And everybody wants air time, it doesn’t matter who you are.
There are nukes in every bunker,
In every silo, near and far,
Write a book on Sound Bite Boulevard, and hitch
A ride in Jon Stewart’s town car.

I know, pretty lame. I’m counting on you, Dear Readers, to do better. Unwrap your creativity before you unwrap your presents. Please submit the original stanza as well as your adaptation. We’ll try this for two weeks (unless this contest bombs). Entries will be posted upon arrival.