http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collins-class_submarine

…then yeah, I digs da diesel. Who the hell puts a reactor in a thing that’s supposed to get shot at? That’s just dopey.

But no matter how much people point at how hard it might be to find a carrier to shoot at, I really can’t see it. I mean, if the Iranians can get anything at all to 20,000 feet they can get (hazy) line of sight to the other side of the Gulf. Even their dodgy ASBMs have optical guidance – one solid fix should do it. A 5 minute flight time isn’t going to let a carrier group get THAT far away.

If the Chinese did go ahead and MIRV their 21-D and produce the new beasty in numbers (or if they might in the near future), then they own a hefty slab of the western pacific, even if people haven’t really noticed yet.

That is one thing. Another is that ensuring defeat of US BMD costs them something, and when we are done with current plans at the end of this decade, what comes next? Does the US BMD enterprise shut down at that point, or is it on to the next, grander, and perhaps more dangerous scheme? Will Russia and China then face a further round of costs to ensure defeat of BMD, or might there even be a danger of vulnerability to a US first strike?

And what of the space weaponization implications, given that US BMD systems are already ASAT-capable, and the dream of space-based BMD weapons has never quite died?

For all these reasons, Russian and Chinese concerns about and protests against US BMD are not just ritual.

It may just be that they are concerned not just about their own security risks, but also the economic and political costs of endless rounds of measure and countermeasure, and about global security and stability as well. As should we all be.

—What about diesel-electric subs with suicide drones ionstead of artillery?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_submarine_Surcouf

This huge submarine carried twin 8 inch guns in a single turret, quite a formidible armament for a submarine, and in a hangar aft of her conning tower was an observation aircraft, a Marcel Berson-411, capable of a speed of 100 knots with a range of 400 kilometres. A cargo of torpedoes, 14 by 500mm, and another 8 by 400mm added to her fighting abilities. A 16 foot motor boat was also on board.

http://ahoy.tk-jk.net/macslog/FrenchSubmarineSurcoufthe.html

Aegis can theoretically engage three targets simultaneously – though I’m not aware of a successful test with more than two. Cost-for-cost, it should be very practical to overwhelm an Aegis-based defence. Quite apart from the relative platform costs, there’s the ongoing issue of keeping sufficient Aegis defence on-station – while your ASBMs can be parked in compounds for as long as you like. Then all you need is something capable of detecting the enemy.

Look at Taiwan with non-Chinese navies removed from the equation. Look at the Gulf with Iran holding the ability to remove a carrier group almost at will, or ready to back up any wee patrol boat’s demands. All with conventional warheads – and therefore *usable*. I doubt they’re at that threat level yet, but I can’t see any reason to think they can’t be in the fairly near future. It changes the picture a very great deal, and if the US is not working very hard on improved ABM defences then I reckon they’re making a big mistake.

1. They don’t want that; it would just make the United States very, very angry. They might, in extreme cases, want to attack the United States with enough nuclear weapons to actually destroy it, but at that scale there is no anonymity or plausible deniability.

2. Since that sort of thing is very much a matter of last resort, you want to make absolutely sure nobody goes off-mission and pulls the trigger before you are good and ready. That means basing the weapons somewhere you have absolute control and security.

3. What nuclear weapons are actually good for is not attacking people, but threatening to attack people. But, as Dr. Strangelove famously pointed out, trying to threaten people with a secret weapon doesn’t really work so well.

4. If you were paying attention in the first place, you’d have noted that Michael Krepon’s most excellent article was not about people who might hypothetically want to attack (or even threaten) the United States with nuclear weapons, but people who want to threaten Taiwan with nuclear weapons. As with most domestic disputes, the obvious suspect is unlikely to succeed with any plan for clever misdirection.

Since you asked. I suspect your question may have been purely rhetorical, but I have the bad habit of sometimes answering those questions anyway…