The only top-of-the-charts space-age instrumental was silenced by the highest yield US atmospheric test ever conducted.

OK, I’m taking literary license.

Readers of a certain age will recall Telstar, the satellite and the top-40 single. Telstar enabled the transmission of images across the Atlantic on our black-and-white TV screens, just as the British music invasion of the US airwaves was building. Before the Beatles scored their first number-one hit and transfixed us on the Ed Sullivan Show, another British band, The Tornados, topped the US charts with Telstar, a tune inspired by the satellite. Telstar was one of the satellites victimized by Starfish Prime, the 1.45-megaton whopper detonated 248 miles above the Pacific. Telstar was dying from nuclear effects while it was #1 on the Hit Parade.

Want to know more about the intersection of national security and space, as viewed through the prism of the US-Soviet competition? Try Clay Moltz’s The Politics of Space Security (2008). [Another disclaimer: my last book and this one share the same publisher.] One peripheral episode in Clay’s book might explain how Telstar and Starfish Prime helped to tip the scales toward the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

In 1962, President Kennedy was being whipsawed by conflicting pressures over atmospheric tests. His gut – and growing public sentiment angered by fallout – told him to negotiate a test ban. What’s more, JFK’s science advisors were telling him that continued testing could place the health of astronauts at risk. But Kennedy was also under intense pressure to resume atmospheric detonations after the Kremlin broke a 34-month-long moratorium and began a cascade of tests in September 1961. The United States followed suit, and missile defense advocates were particularly keen to learn more about the effects of high-yield atmospheric detonations. They got their wish on July 9, 1962, when a Thor missile was launched from Johnston Island carrying a W-49 warhead.

Here’s Clay’s account of the percussive effects of Starfish Prime:

The blast disrupted radio transmissions as far away as California and Australia for several hours. As Atomic Energy Commissioner Glenn Seaborg noted in his memoirs, ‘To our great surprise and dismay, it developed that STARFISH added significantly to the electrons in the Van Allen belts. This result contravened all our predictions.’ The test proved embarrassing and costly, particularly as British and U.S. scientists had cautioned against its likely effects. The EMP radiation it generated eventually disabled at least six satellites, including the British Ariel I, the U.S. Traac, Transit 4B, Injun I, Telstar I, and the Soviet Kosmos 5.”

US atmospheric testing continued after Starfish Prime, but not for long. Many risks were clarified by this test: risks to public health and to astronauts, who were far bigger rock stars than the Tornados; risks to satellites, communication links, and command and control, as well as the risks of relying on missile defenses in the event of nuclear exchanges. Clay writes that Starfish Prime helped convince JFK that his gut was right and that a test ban treaty was needed.

The modern-day equivalent of Starfish Prime was the PLA’s kinetic energy anti-satellite test on January 11, 2007. This test, carried out at twice the altitude of Starfish Prime, had appalling debris consequences, increasing the collision risk to approximately 700 satellites in low earth orbit, according to the US Air Force Space Command. The test produced over 2,000 pieces of debris large enough to be catalogued and tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network and over 35,000 smaller debris fragments. Space objects and manned space operations will have to dodge this debris for decades.

Why did China create such a mess in space? We don’t know for sure because Beijing still operates on the presumption that transparency can reflect weakness, while opaqueness can increase strength. We do not know, for example, whether China’s leaders were warned of, as President Kennedy was, or had the presence of mind to inquire about the dangers to manned spaceflight that could result from testing.

My guess is that the reasons for China’s KE-ASAT test may not be very different from those reflected in Starfish Prime: anxieties over national security, deference to excessive military testing requirements, and an inability to envision just how messy the test consequences would actually be.

Can significant good result from China’s irresponsible KE-ASAT test? Some positives are already apparent. Recognition of the space debris problem has now extended beyond experts to national leaders. Another glaring problem, the absence of space traffic management mechanisms, is starting to be addressed. The US Strategic Command’s Joint Space Operations Center has stepped up to the plate by voluntarily issuing potential collision or conjunction warnings – including 400 notices to Russia and China over the past year. In other words, the United States is now reminding China on a regular basis of the potentially catastrophic consequences of conducting a high-altitude KE-ASAT test.

Growing sensitivity to threats to the global commons of space and provisional steps to manage the debris problem is insufficient. China’s KE-ASAT test, like Starfish Prime five decades ago, warrants more structured and far-reaching protective measures. The modern-day analog to the Limited Test Ban Treaty is a Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations that addresses debris and traffic management imperatives. If China blocks its creation, its leaders will have not learned nearly enough from their KE-ASAT test.