One of Herb York’s many talents was his ability to write clearly with a strong narrative line, despite his training in physics and immersion in technical detail. See, for example, Herb’s book, The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb (1976). This slim volume tells a cautionary tale about nuclear technology.

In the preface, Herb writes,

The United States has pursued policies which caused the technological arms race to advance at a substantially faster pace than was really necessary for America’s own national security… The reason is that the United States is richer and more powerful, and its science and technology are more dynamic and generate more ideas and inventions of all kinds, including ever more powerful and exotic means of mass destruction. In short, the root of the problem has not been maliciousness, but rather a sort of technological exuberance that has overwhelmed the other factors that go into the making of overall national policy.

Herb’s book is about the indirect clash between Oppenheimer and Teller to influence President Truman’s decision on whether or not to engage in a crash effort to develop and test H-bombs. Oppenheimer was an insider, the most influential advisor on the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission. He saw no need for a crash program and found no design then under discussion to be feasible. Oppenheimer argued that diversifying the U.S. arsenal of atomic weapons would suffice to hedge against the Soviet threat. In his novel, Underworld, Don DeLillo characterized the A-bomb as “The sun’s own heat that swallows cities.” Oppenheimer, the overseer of weapon designs that swallowed cities, sought to avoid building weapons with far more destructive capacity. Teller was at that time an outsider. His passion for the “super” was not appreciated by his colleagues at Los Alamos.

Teller won by a non-technical knock out, even though, in Herb’s telling, “The side with the weaker formal position won the debate.” Oppenheimer and Teller’s standing were reversed as a result of the behind-closed-doors controversy over the H-bomb. The eventual coup de grâce was the revocation of Oppenheimer’s security clearance in 1954. During this proceeding, Teller testified that Oppenheimer’s judgment and actions were “exceedingly hard to understand” and that, “I feel that I would like to see the vital interests of this country in hands which I understand better, and therefore trust more.” When pressed, Teller concluded that it “would be wiser not to grant clearance.” Two years earlier, a new lab was launched at Livermore to compete with Los Alamos in designing the H-bomb. Teller served on its Scientific Steering Committee. Livermore’s first director was Herb York.

Despite the General Advisory Committee’s sound technical arguments against a crash program, Truman sided with Teller because he could not be sure that Stalin would exercise similar restraint. Indeed, he had good reason to suspect otherwise. Nobel Prize winner Harold Urey vocalized the clinching argument this way: “I am very unhappy to conclude that the hydrogen bomb should be developed and built. I do not think we should intentionally lose the armaments race; to do this will be to lose our liberties.”

The more distance Herb York gained from this crucible, the more he wanted a complete end to nuclear testing. During the negotiating end-game of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we traveled many miles together trying to counter last-ditch efforts to undermine the treaty. Moscow, Beijing, and Paris had other ideas. They saddled the Treaty with an entry-into-force clause requiring no fewer than 44 specified states, including North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, and Egypt, to deposit their instruments of ratification before the Treaty would become legally binding.

By way of comparison, the Limited Test Ban Treaty banning atmospheric tests required only three countries to deposit their instruments of ratification — the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The Nonproliferation Treaty required these three plus any forty states that wished to join them. China and France signed up to the NPT twenty-two years after it entered into force.

The Clinton administration didn’t push back against the CTBT’s worst-ever entry-into-force provision until it was too late. The Government of India took great offense at being named as an essential signatory and refrained from further proceedings in Geneva. After splitting London away from Moscow, Beijing, and Paris, the Clinton White House concluded that a better treaty couldn’t be negotiated in 1996. The CTBT remains in limbo because nine designated countries have yet to ratify: the United States, China, Israel, Egypt, Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Indonesian officials have indicated they intend to come on board. Three countries – India, Pakistan, and North Korea – have yet to sign, let alone ratify.

Despite efforts by some to prevent the CTBT from becoming legally binding, it has greatly strengthened an international norm against nuclear testing. (Is North Korea the company you wish to keep?) Another side benefit of the Treaty and the demise of the Soviet Union is that Herb’s fear of Bomb-related technological exuberance has waned greatly. The budgets of Livermore and Los Alamos for stockpile stewardship have been fattened under the CTBT, but as the George W. Bush administration discovered, the Labs have lost the power to promote new weapon designs. The United States now pursues exuberances of a different sort.