In 2007, Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev helped the Stimson Center develop a draft Code of Conduct for responsible space-faring nations, but they were unsatisfied with the result. As Sergey writes in a fine new monograph, Outer Space: Weapons, Diplomacy, and Security (2010) published by the Carnegie Endowment, Stimson’s proposal wasn’t nearly ambitious enough:

The COC should ban any activities aimed at either destroying or reducing the stable operation of systems in space and should restrict the creation, deployment, and use of any weapons systems designed with this purpose in mind. Another potential objective for the COC might be to impose certain limits on the provocative deployment of destabilizing surveillance and reconnaissance systems in space…

Only a few of the Russian proposals were incorporated into the model COC of October 2007 that resulted from the joint efforts by non-governmental organizations from Canada, Russia, France, Japan, and the United States. It could not have been otherwise, as the document was the product of a compromise aimed at gaining the approval of the leading nations at an official level.

In his chapter on “Preventing an Arms Race in Space,” Alexei notes that the Russia/Chinese draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space “at least affirmed the urgent nature of the problem.” Nonetheless, he notes that the PPWT has significant deficiencies: it “excludes Earth-to-space systems, which are developing most rapidly and could begin service within the foreseeable future,” including Chinese and “possibly” Russian land-based ASATs. “Although this discriminatory approach may be quite understandable from a military standpoint,” Alexei writes, “it could hardly become a basis for practical negotiations.”

How, then, to proceed?

Alexei suggests the following:

Instead of prohibiting deployment [of space weapons], the parties could resolve this problem indirectly by initially agreeing to prohibit testing of anti-satellite and space-strike BMD systems, focusing on tests involving the actual destruction of either target satellites or ballistic missiles and their elements at flight trajectories – the kind of tests conducted by the USSR between 1960 and the 1980s, by the United States in 1985, and by China in 2007. Verification of this agreement could be based on the NTMV of the respective parties, preferably in conjunction with cooperative measures and well-defined transparency.

A trade-off that prohibits ground-based ASAT tests and space-based tests offers symmetry and coherence lacking in the PPWT, and deserves to be taken seriously. This approach, as Alexei notes, has both advantages and disadvantages. In the latter category, I would highlight the likelihood that BMD tests could serve as surrogates for ASAT testing, thereby defeating the purpose of a test ban. It’s not clear to me how this loophole can be closed except by banning BMD tests, which is a non-starter for the United States, its friends, and allies.

In their concluding chapter, Alexei and General Dvorkin offer a near-term approach:

While progress on legally binding treaties has stalled, interim solutions could include using codes that are politically binding without being weighed down by complex definitions, record-keeping and counting rules, and methods of verification data exchange… The greatest potential contribution of such a code of conduct in space would be to create the political conditions needed for negotiations on full-fledged and legally binding treaties to ban or limit space weapons.