No country has been more optimistic about the atom than India. Most Indians believe in nuclear energy and in the ability of their nuclear establishment to deliver it efficiently and cheaply. Indian strategic analysts tend to be extremely confident, which often results in a dismissive attitude toward Pakistan. Indian government leaders have been proud about their ambivalence toward the Bomb, while being optimistic about the benefits of minimal nuclear deterrence. In Pakistan, on the other hand, deterrence pessimism reigns. This helps explain why India has been so relaxed about nuclear weapon-related issues, while Pakistan takes them so seriously.

Here are a few quotes from my shoe boxes that reflect India’s longstanding nuclear optimism:

“India’s nuclear test can pave the way for the creation of stable conditions on the subcontinent by making Islamabad realize the futility of seeking artificial and, indeed, unattainable military parity with a many times bigger country… Pakistan will have to adjust itself to the realities of the situation.” — J.P. Jain, Nuclear India, Vol. I, 1974.

“If a mutual minimum nuclear deterrence is in place, it will act as a stabilizing factor… Possession of nuclear weapons would give Pakistan the confidence to face a larger neighbor with security and honour… This confidence on the part of Pakistan is to be welcomed as it is a positive asset for national sobriety and regional stability.” — General K. Sundarji, India’s Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1996

“Islamabad should realise the change in the geo-strategic situation in the region and the world. It must roll back its anti-India policy especially with regard to Kashmir. Any other course will be futile and costly for Pakistan.” — Public statement by Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani after India’s nuclear tests, 1998

“Now both India and Pakistan are in possession of nuclear weapons. There is no alternative but to live in mutual harmony.” — Public statement by Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, after Pakistan also tests nuclear devices, 1998

“The only sensible option would be to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff… Indian public opinion will accept nothing short of the final dismemberment of Pakistan in case that country chooses to cross the nuclear Rubicon.” — Gurmeet Kanwal, Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal, 2001

India should “hold its nerve and coolly ratchet up the proceedings and compel Pakistan to make good its threat [of first use] or back down.” — Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, 2002

The most stable pairing in the world of nuclear weapons is between two deterrence optimists. But these dyads are hard to find, unless you want to pair Great Britain and France. The most worrisome dyads – the ones that generate arms racing and dangerous behaviors – are between two deterrence pessimists, as exemplified by the United States and the Soviet Union. Another pairing of deterrence pessimists will occur if Iran joins Israel as a state that possesses nuclear weapons.

The pairing of a deterrence optimist with a deterrence pessimist, as in South Asia, is unusual, lending itself to an arms competition, not an arms race. This competition will heat up over the next decade, testing the assurance of India’s nuclear optimists. If I were still teaching at the University of Virginia, I’d turn this conjunction into a midterm exam: Is the pairing of a deterrence optimist with a deterrence pessimist good or bad for strategic stability? And does it matter if the optimist is the stronger or weaker party?